This paper aims at exploring the effect of the Egyptian context on shaping executives' motives to manage earnings; and identifying the most influential managerial motives: managerial self-interests and external environmental factors. The research adopts an interpretative methodology and interview methods. Interviewees were conducted with twenty managers representing five different companies within industrial and service sectors of the Egyptian economy. The findings of this research suggest that a firm's context has an influence on shaping managers' self-interests and that in Egypt the job market is a powerful motive for managing the financial reports, followed by cash bonuses; however, stockbased compensation lacks the power to motivate managers into making such financial improvements. In addition, this paper concludes that environmental motives are more important than motives related to managers' self-interests, because managers cannot achieve their own interests without complying with the external pressures or motives to manage the financial reports. The principal contribution of this paper is to build on the previous earnings management literature to consider the firms' context while studying managers' motives. It pairs the economic factors with institutional factors to form the main reasons behind: 1) managers' engagement in earnings management; and 2) the superiority of environmental factors over the managerial selfinterests motives. It also sheds light on, there is no one pattern of earning management motivations fit all contexts. This paper also contributes to the new institutional sociology literature by bringing managers' interests and power into the centre of the conceptual framework.
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Introduction:
As Degeorge et al. (1999) argue, earnings recorded on executives' "watch" explicitly and implicitly determine their rewards e.g. employment decisions and compensation contracts. Noting that makes managers' own self-interests exert pressure on them to alter the reported earnings figures for the sake of serving such interests. Consequently, executives can be motivated to distort reported earnings in a self-serving manner (ibid.).
It has been argued that attempts by managers to adjust reported income for the sake of painting a favourable financial image of the firm derive not only from executives' self interests but also from company's interest and reputation with outsiders. These incentives include (Makhaiel and Sherer, 2017) . These earnings management (EM) motives, in turn, can be classified into two sorts of motivations. The first is external motivations, aiming at enhancing the firm's reputation with outsiders e.g. stakeholders, creditors, employees, and Stock Exchange; the second is managerial motivations related to achieve managers' own self-interests e.g. increasing executives' compensation packages, securing their employment, and enhancing their professional reputation.
Although prior studies have individually documented that executives are able to game the perceptions of outside parties; the committees of directors who determine their compensation plans i.e. the value; and the nature of compensation; or job market; they nonetheless contain gaps which need to be addressed. Those gaps are generated by many factors including: studying managers' self-interested motives in isolation of their context by emphasizing the cause/effect approach; ignoring the use of appropriate theory for giving clear insight into those motives; the lack of research concerning the EM phenomenon in Arabic countries including Egypt, and a lack of attention given to either the job market's influence on managers' propensity to improve the financial reporting (FRs) or to managerial intentions to manage profits so as to serve their own interests through achieving their firm's interests.
In order to address those gaps, this paper aims at exploring the effect of the Egyptian context on shaping executives' self interests that encourage them to manage FRs by using new institutional sociology (NIS) theory in order to derive a deeper explanation for such phenomena in Egypt. Analysis of executives' views and attitudes, collected from eleven semi-structured interviews, has produced empirical evidence which is consistent with the theory's suggestions. The results suggest that, in the Egyptian context, increasing cash bonuses, protecting managerial jobs, and enhancing their professional career and reputation are influential motives for corporate executives to improve the FRs; in contrast to findings of research conducted in other contexts e.g. US, stockbased compensation has no effect on motivating them to make such financial improvements.
The second purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between two types of managerial motivations: external contextual motives; and managers' self-interests and to identify the most influential and important motives among managerial self-interests for improving FRs. Accordingly, this paper addresses another omission in the previous literature, which is its neglect of the relationship between different kinds of managerial motives to identify the most influential factors. It has been found that corporate executives are concerned with meeting external parties' predictions in order to enhance the firm's relation with such parties as a basic step towards achieving their own interests; executives could not achieve their own self-interests without complying with these external motives. It has also been evidenced that job market motives i.e. job security and professional reputation and career, are considered as more important incentives for improving the FRs than cash bonuses, because it is deduced that achieving job market motives is the cornerstone and basic step to achieve executives' monetary compensation i.e. cash bonuses not the opposite.
This paper also provides evidence that there is no single managerial motive for improving the financial image of the firm; there is a package of different interests, including external pressures and the self-interested motives that corporate executives seek to achieve. This is consistent with Rezaee's (2005) argument that economic motives are paired with other motives such as egocentric and ideological motives to form the main reasons behind managers' engagement in EM. This paper also contributes to the NIS literature by bringing managers' interests and power into the centre of the conceptual framework; it is theoretically argued that executives' interests and power are used as dynamics for reacting to the external environmental pressures to improve the FRs.
The remainder of the paper has five sections. The first section reviews the previous literature pertaining to managerial selfinterested motivations; the second section considers the conceptual framework; the third section describes the methodology and data collection technique; the fourth section contains the empirical findings and results; while a discussion and conclusions are the focus of the final section.
I. Literature on Motives Pertinent to Managers' Selfinterests:
In light of reviewing the prior literature, executives' self-interests as EM motives can be divided into different groups: (1) compensation packages including (a) bonus incentives, (b) stock compensation incentives; and (2) job market incentives involving (a) securing current job, (b) enhancing professional career.
Managerial Compensation Package Motives:
Dechow and Sloan (1991) and Crocker and Slemrod (2007) argue that the association between the reported earnings and the executive compensation package has led to some corporate financial scandals of the early twenty-first century and has revealed the "darker side" of executives' performance-based compensation packages. It is argued that when a firm provides its executives with a performance-based incentive package, either a bonus or stock-based compensation plan. It actually provides its managers with motives for choosing increase-earnings accounting methods and misreporting the true information about the firm's underlying transactions in order to propel the earnings number upward and hence also to boost its compensation package. Therefore, "some degree of earnings management must be tolerated as a necessary part of an efficient agreement" 
Bonus Scheme Motives
Previous research hypothesizes that the positive association between the reported accounting earnings and the executive's annual bonus plans creates managerial impetus to opportunistically choose income-boosting accounting methods for the sake of increasing the firm's reported income, which in turn leads to a rise in managers' awards and bonuses (Balsam, 1998 Graham et al. (2005) and Bange and De Bondt (1998) report evidence that job security (or turnover) and career image and professional reputation play an important role in adjusting the firm's financial report. Most of the current literature suggests dividing job market incentives into two main groups: maintaining the current managerial employment, and enhancing managers' professional reputation and career.
Labour Market Motives

Job Security Motives
It is acknowledged that securing employment is tied up with reported earnings, stock price performance or both, and hence it is considered as a motive for managing earnings (DeAngelo, et al., 1994; Degeorge, et al., 1999; Pourciau, 1993) . Academics have provided empirical evidence about the strong association between poor financial performance and the threat of job losses (Gilson, 1989; Gilson & Vetsuypens, 1993; Weisbach, 1988 
Gaps in Existing Literature
A review of the previous literature has highlighted four gaps, and addressing these gaps provides the motivations for this paper. The first is the environmental gap, which has emerged due to neglect of the influence of the firms' context on identifying executives' compensation schemes and on managers' propensity to manage earnings to serve their own interests. That is, the existing literature has made an environmentally-free assumption, focusing on investigating managerial motives in isolation of their context. However, Doupnik and Richter (2003) and Perera (1989 a) point out that national culture is shaped by various ecological factors such as history, geography, climate, language, economy, demography, technology and religion. Perera (1989 a) takes the view that those cultural factors affect the legal system, capital market and corporate ownership within a nation. The same argument can be applied for the effect of cultural factors on a firm's culture and on defining the firm's regulatory rules and company laws, which include identifying the managers' compensation plans. In addition, Gray (1988) suggests that it is expected that accountants' and managers' attitudes and behaviour will be guided by these cultural values. This indicates that the culture of a nation affects not only its socioeconomic structure, e.g. legal system and company laws, but also societal attitudes, motives and self-interests.
The second gap is due to the lack of consideration given to the job market's influence on motivating managers, although some research has attempted to address such motives. In addition, there is a lack of research investigating managerial intentions to make real financial improvements in order to serve their own interests as well as those of the firm; previous research has tended to focus on either violations of accounting standards or abuse of real business activities.
The relationship between different types of motives constitutes the third gap: although accounting literature on EM motivations sheds light on different categories of managerial motives, there is no research that has given due consideration to exploring the relationship between them or establishing which motives are most powerful and thus act as drivers for others. Therefore, this creates a need to explore the relationship between different categories of motivations.
The fourth gap concerns the almost universal adoption of a positivist methodology which fails to capture the effect of the role of contextual elements of reality in shaping managers' selfmotives. Instead, an interpretive approach provides an alternative perspective and a methodological approach that enhances our understanding of managerial self-interested motivations in their wider economic and social context. 
II. The Extension of the New Institutional Sociology
Extending NIS to Overcome the Critcisms
Overcoming this shortcoming involves the necessity for NIS to be expanded to include organizational actors' power and interests, especially in relation to the important role of such power, interests and actions in determining whether the adoption of certain accounting practices have been applied or rejected (DiMaggio, 1988; Granovetter, 1985) Expanding NIS leads organizational actors to be viewed as "more plastic, calculating and manipulable than they usually are'' (DiMaggio, 1988: 5); and to focus on the fact that organizational actors can manipulate the symbols they present to the external environment (Powell, 1991), as a means of reacting to external pressures. That is, organizational members do not take a passive role when reacting to external forces in choosing their own work practices (Moll, 2006 and Kholeif, et al., 2007) . The following sections explain managers' power and interests as motives for complying with external pressures. Managers use their power to create rules and legitimate strategy to improve the FRs for adhering to external pressures in order to achieve their own interests argues that without giving greater and more explicit concern to the organizational actors' interests and 'agency', institutional theorists will be unable to explain the reasons behind the emergence, deterioration and elimination of a particular practice. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) voice that the necessity of taking power and interests into account emerges from the observation that, when actors in key institutions recognize that they can gain benefits from adopting and maintaining certain institutions or practices, then powerful and dominant actors can enact strategies for control. Therefore, different organizational responses are based on differences in organizations' goals, interests and usable power (Tolbert, 1985; Zucker, 1987) . From the foregoing discussion it is obvious that organizational actors' power and interests are the determinants, dynamics or motives for creating a reactive strategy to improve the FRs to comply with external environmental motives.
Dynamics to Create Reactive Mechanism to the External Motives
Executives' Self-interests Dynamics or Motives to Create Reactive Mechanism
Professional self-interest is paramount when a new organizational practice is adopted and the previous one is discarded (Carpenter & Dirsmith,1993; DiMaggio & Powell,1991; Perrow, 1985; Powell, 1985; Scott, 1987) . Shapin (1982) argues that creating knowledge or a strategy is considered as goal-directed action; it is not tailored in isolation of an individual's goals and interests but is tailored in order to "further particular collectively sustained goals". To that effect, it is assumed that the actors/managers' behaviour and actions for adopting voluntarily preferred practice i. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) suggest that, when organizational actors become dissatisfied because the adoption of a certain rule or practice does not serve their interests, this dissatisfaction leads them to question the current practice, which then causes them to make a change. That is, actors' dissatisfaction with the way in which their interests are accommodated within the firm creates a potential pressure for change. Overall, it can be seen that organizational actors' self-interests constitute motives or dynamics for determining whether or not they create a mechanism to improve the FRs in order to comply with environmental motives e.g. outsiders and regulative bodies' requirements. However, serving such interests requires actors who have sufficient power to pursue them. Institutionalists argue that agents' ability to either support or thwart the adoption of an institutionally imposed practice is based on possessing enabling dynamics, and on the extent to which agents can mobilize sufficient power to achieve their goals and interests ( ( 
Consequences of Creating Rule-based Technique
As a result, using a rule-based mechanism strengthens the firm's legitimacy, decreases turbulence, maintains its stability, and hence mobilizes support from a broader range of external bodies. This enables the firm to enjoy support from external resource providers, gives it greater flexible access to resources, and in turn enhances its success and survival prospects ( This enables firms to appear to be working in good faith, and increases confidence, which enhances their legitimacy and reputation with those outsiders. The consequent rise in legitimacy and reputation would result in many benefits for the firm and its managers: 1) increasing social support; 2) easing access to external financial and non-financial key resources; 3) enhancing and sustaining its survival in the long term; and hence 4) fulfilling managers' self-interests in terms of job security, and enhancing professional reputation, power, prestige and other monetary benefits.
II. Research Design and Method
Yin (2009) and Patton (2002) explained that survey is one of many qualitative methods used for collecting data. In order to fulfil the paper's purpose, semi-structured interviews are considered to be the most suitable method for collecting data. Because it allows a predetermined list of questions and to be set in advance and to use unstructured probes (Arthur & Nazroq, 2003 ; Berg, 1995; Patton, 2002) . As shown in Figure (1) , the interview guide comprises both opening questions (essential or general) and probing questions, which cover the issues related to corporate executives' self-interested motives and the most important motives for managers to improve financial reports. According to Berg (1995), in preparing the interview guide sufficient attention should be given to various issues 3 , including the translation of interview questions, because they are going to be used to interview respondents from another country who speak a different language. Patton (2002) argues that information gathered from interviewing is essentially words, and these words may mean various things in various cultures. Egypt is the research context, and hence more emphasis was placed on translating interview questions from English to Arabic and vice versa after the data collection and during data analysis process. 
III. Results and Findings
Corporate Executives' Self-interests Motives
As suggested by Carpenter and Feroz (2001), corporate executives' decisions are directed toward serving their own selfinterests. :
"Selfish behaviour has a place in management's thinking as normal human behaviour; on the whole, managerial decisions are based on selfinterests". (M9, a chairman of a board of directors)
The following sections analyse executives' opinions regarding this issue: the first section analyses executives' responses to compensation package motivations i.e. bonus and stock compensation plans; while the second section analyses executives' responses to job market incentives involving: securing their current job and enhancing their professional career.
Compensation Scheme Motives
The executives' incentivizing scheme usually comprises a cash bonus (portion of profits) and stock-based plans. This scheme is normally based on the reported profit figure (Healy, et al., 1987) . Therefore, Watts and Zimmerman ( Executives also highlight that profit maximization is the main target of the firm's owners and that managers are their agents, so that increasing the firm's profits is the responsibility of the managers, who must be compensated for doing so:
"Profits or profit maximization is the aim of shareholders, and managers are the agents of the shareholders to achieve such aim for them; this also benefits the firm's managers in terms of getting a distribution percentage from such profits" (M10, a financial manager).
Stock-based Compensation Plan Motives
Dechow and Skinner (2000) argue that, over the last two decades, there has been increasing emphasis on stock-based compensation contracts as a motivation for EM, because this kind of management compensation increasingly couples top managers' wealth with the firm's stock price. Importantly, under Egyptian company law, there is no opportunity to compensate firms' executives by stocks. Thus, the stock-compensation plan has no effect on a firm's managers' intention to improve the firm's financial position in the Egyptian context. Therefore, executives are not too concerned with stockbased compensation as a motive for improving the reported earnings because they view acquiring stock as the least important of their aims, as expressed in the following comments:
"At the end of my objective list is gaining some of the firm's stocks" (M1, a financial manager) . "For me the last motive for improving the firm's financial report is seeking to get the firm's stocks" (M2, a accounting manager).
Job Market Motives
Besides the executives' compensation scheme, the labour market is another influential factor motivating managers to improve financial reports. This motivation can be further divided into two types: securing the current job; and improving the professional career and reputation. Analysis of the executives' responses to questions about job market motivations is presented in the following sections.
Job Security Motives
As argued by Degeorge et al. (1999) , the association between reported earnings and job preservation induces a firm's managers to improve their financial results. Thus, securing their current job or avoiding dismissal is a motivation for improving the published profits figure (DeAngelo, et al., 1994; Pourciau, 1993) . From the executives' responses, it can be clearly seen that there is general agreement regarding this issue, as executives believe in the importance of improving the financial image of the firm to secure their own jobs. The following quote summarizes the executives' beliefs: protect their jobs" (M10, a financial manager, emphasis added) .
"Firm's owners need profits as the main aim of any private company; in the case of reporting losses the financial manager, the managing director or/and the chairman of the board of directors will fly. This increases managers' emphasis on the financial results of the company to
Executives believe that improving the firm's financial image by creating profits leads to shareholder satisfaction because profit maximisation is their main aim, and without the owners' satisfaction they cannot secure their own jobs. That is, if the managers fail to achieve the owners' main aim (profits), they will definitely lose their jobs, as a financial manager (M10) explains:
"Profits or profit maximization is the aim of shareholders... achieving the owners' aim means keeping their jobs". This belief is based on the grounds that the managers are the agents of the firm's owners and is responsible for adopting the best policies and making effective decisions for running the firm successfully and for achieving favourable outcomes by using their experience. Thus, executives believe that, based on the firm's operational performance, the general assembly of shareholders (GAS) determines whether they still trust the current managers and whether they are satisfied with its achievements, and in turn influences their decision about whether or not to keep the existing managers. Undesirable financial results lead to a loss of shareholder trust in the firm's managers, which in turn leads them to replace current managers with new managers capable of achieving better results: "Top management is the party which is directly affected by the reported financial and operational results. Because top executives are responsible for making the operational decisions, the results of those decisions are the bases used by the general assembly of shareholders to make decisions regarding whether they renew their trust in top managers or not.. . For the top management the most important  motivation to avoid undesirable results is protecting their current job  because bad operational results lead to a loss of investors' trust in management's work and hence they will not renew current managers' contracts and they will lose their jobs" (M2, an accounting manager, emphasis added).
However, executives believe that not all cases of reporting losses will lead them to lose their jobs; they expressed the view that the likelihood of losing their job depends on whether or not there are logical reasons justifying the unfavourable operational performance of the firm. When GAS finds out why executives remained silent and did not make decisions to improve the operational results of the firm, they decide whether or not managers should be replaced. If losses were due to certain environmental factors, e.g. political and economic factors, this does not have any negative effect on managers' jobs: "Management will be questioned about reporting losses...owners will ask you why you did not take actions to avoid losses; why you remained silent when the company lost money; the answers to those questions affect your ability to stay in your position" (M10, a financial manager).
"In the case of losses which are achieved under common and normal conditions I will lose my job. However, if the losses are achieved under abnormal conditions like what is happening nowadays [Egyptian revolution], nobody can say that the managers (or the board of directors) of a company which reports losses will be dismissed" (M6, a financial manager).
Executives believe that the field in which a firm operates has an effect on concerns about their jobs; the executives of brokerage companies drew a significant link between achieving desirable financial results and maintaining their jobs. The executives of brokerage companies appeared to believe that the turnover in their field is very high so that an unfavourable performance will definitely result in the loss of their jobs. This makes them very anxious about keeping their jobs, as the following comment from managing director (M8) illustrates: "... Keeping a top management job is a prime factor leading executives to improve the financial reports, especially in our field [brokerage] where the labour turnover is very high ... there is strong and sensitive relation between achieving good results and keeping my job. Of course, in this field, there are great concerns about my job in a company which achieves undesirable results i.e. losses". In addition, executives believe that an improved professional reputation, which is built on their previous performance, makes them highly sought after in the job market, and enables them to get a better job more easily in the future. They consider a good professional reputation as a form of wealth, which they can use and invest at any time when required: "I seek to create a better reputation in my field to enable me to move to another company at any time. I will have an enhanced reputation, which encourages other companies in my field to favour and want me to work for them... This good reputation will be my treasury and wealth, which I can invest whenever I like" (M3, a financial controller).
Professional Reputation and Career Motives
Executives expressed the view that gaining high monetary returns from their work is not an object per se, but that those high returns reflect the fact that they are highly valued human capital and highly reputed professionals, due to their effectiveness and success:
"Doubtless, earning high salaries and cash bonuses is not an aim per se but it is a title and an indicator that I am highly evaluated ... the more salary I earn, the more success I achieved. The more success I achieved, the higher valuation I get" (M9, a chairman of the board of directors).
As well as reputation, their professional career is another motive for improving the financial image of a firm. All the executives of various ages associated an individual's professional career with their ambition to look for better positions, which thereby motivates them to confirm their success and effectiveness by improving the firm's financial image. They stated that, if there is no ambition, there will not be any motivation to look for better career prospects and in turn to achieve success and financial improvement. An analysis of the executives' responses reveals clear-cut agreement that, in Egypt, a young person at the beginning of his career does not always occupy a very high position, so that he/she is ambitious and significantly motivated to seek out better opportunities, and hence to build and improve his career. So that managers at the beginning of their career are motivated to make financial improvements, which help them to achieve success, to enhance their reputation, to seek more advanced positions, and hence to build their career or curriculum vitae (CV) as a professional:
"For me, ambition and looking forward to better prospects e.g. better job, reputation, salary and career are my motives for making decisions designed to increase profits...If there is no ambition and desire for improvement, there will be no motives for me" (M3, a financial controller, 38 years old).
"In Egypt, young people at the beginning of their professional career; do not occupy high positions, so that a person at the beginning of his career is more willing to improve the financial image of the firm to improve his position (M11, CEO), 59 years old).
Importantly, a financial manager (M5) stated "... The person at the end of his career does not have such ambition to improve the financial reports because he is going to leave the job market".
However, other executives believe that an individual at the end of his career is motivated to improve a firm's financial image in order to maintain his/her good professional history and previous career reputation, which they have succeeded in building up over their professional history.
"... A person in the last years of his career likes to keep his reputation and professional image, which he has built over his whole professional life. A good career history, which he succeeded in creating over 20-30 years, he will not be willing to jeopardise it in the last years of his career by reporting undesirable financial results " (M7, a financial manager).
Comparison Between Different Managerial Motives
This section focuses on the second purpose of the paper; it analyzes the executives' views to provide evidence about whether external motives or managers' self-interested motives are considered the most important incentives for improving the FRs, and whether monetary or non-monetary issues constitute the most significant inducements for doing so.
Comparison Between Outside Parties Motives and Executives' Self-interests Motives
As argued by Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), executives may manipulate earnings in order to game the capital market and, more generally, to influence outsiders' perceptions of the firm's future affairs so as to serve their own self-interests. When asked their views on whether pressure from outsiders or their own selfinterests are the strongest motivational factors shaping their behaviour to improve financial results, in general they are quick to assert that both factors are "one package" and they are "two sides of one coin:
"All those motivations are one package; it is difficult to separate between them" (M11, a chief executive officer (CEO)).
"There are no clear cut boundaries between the firm's interests e.g. success and reputation with its outsiders and managers' self-interests e.g. success and reputation, they are two faces of one coin" (M10, a financial manager).
Importantly, they believe that building, maintaining and improving the outside parties' long-term-trust in the company are the bases and the cornerstone from which they must start to achieve their own self-interests, as expressed in the following comment:
"My firm's stability and achieving its targets and interests are the basic step in achieving my own targets. I can pursue my self-interests through achieving the firm's interest... I seek to achieve the firm's targets first, and consequently I start determining and achieving my own targets" (M3, a financial controller) .
The executives emphasized the strong relationship between the firm's success and reputation and their own success and professional reputation. They believed that the firm's good reputation and strong relations with relevant outsiders reflects positively on the managers' interests i.e. professional reputation, which has a favourable influence on managers' ability to keep their jobs. Importantly, one financial manager (M7) claimed that "improving the firm's image in outsiders' eyes must be the first priority of the managers' concern, followed by other lesser priorities e.g. keeping the job and the like".
In addition, the executives asserted that unless they coping with the firm's peers in the field by reporting a comparable earnings level, they are in danger of losing their jobs. This is because managers' failure to cope with other firms will be perceived as reflecting its ineffectiveness and thus seen as abortive management, as explained by the following executive: "... If all companies in the field achieve good financial results and my company do not... this reflects the managers' failure ... When other firms except our managers achieve good results, this means that it is unsuccessful or abortive management... In this case, I must take care because I will be fired" (M6, a financial manager).
The executives felt that placing more short-run emphasis on their self-interests and ignoring the firm's interests and its reputation with outsiders in the long-run would lead to failure for the firm and its managers. Ignoring the firm's reputation and relationship with outsiders in the long-term would lead to the destruction of what managers had previously built up and gained for itself, as expressed by the following respondent:
"Of course, enhancing the firm's interests in terms of enhancing its reputation with outsiders is the more powerful factor for me to improve the financial image of my firm; a person may mistakenly think that his self-interests are more important than firm's the interests. Managers' self-interests are temporary and short-term. If I focused on my selfinterests and placed them before the firm's interests, I would lose mine" (M9, a chairman of the board of directors).
Comparison Between Managerial Self-interests Motives: Monetary and Non-monetary
As shown above, managers' self-interests comprise monetary interests, i.e. cash bonus, and non-monetary interests, i.e. job security and professional career and reputation. As suggested by Indjejikian (1999) , implicit incentives such as career image and reputation are favoured more by executives relative to explicit incentives e.g. monetary factors, when choosing or adopting a particular practice. Closer scrutiny of their responses indicates that the majority of executives felt that job market motives are more important than monetary motivations. The executives believed that there is a mutual relationship between job security and professional reputation; they can enhance each other. They also saw job security or professional reputation as a basic tool with which to acquire monetary returns and other non-monetary benefits. Regarding the importance of job security, the executives thought that, if they lost their employment, they would lose their salary and reputation, i.e. lose both cash and non-cash advantages. As for the importance of the professional reputation, the executives view building up and improving their professional reputation, which is based on their efficiency and ability to succeed the firm is a basic way of keeping their jobs. Building up a good reputation will result in gaining more reputation, hence remaining in employment, and enjoying additional kinds of incentives, including increased cash advantages. "... Achieving better financial results enhances my reputation, because I am able to change the firm's financial results from losses to profits, hence this means that I can keep my job and that I must be compensated with cash returns" (M8, a managing director) . Surprisingly, perhaps, none of those interviewed mentioned that monetary factors such as high salaries or cash bonuses can yield moral and non-monetary benefits e.g. job security, better professional reputation and career opportunities.
IV. Discussion and Conclusion
The first aim of this paper is to present empirical evidence consistent with theoretical suggestions about managers' ability to react to those external motives by using their power in order to serve their own interests. Those interests are influenced by the context in which managers work. It is deduced that, in the Egyptian context, three out of the four factors considered as selfmanagerial motives have a highly influential effect on managers' propensity to improve the FRs; however, the fourth factor has no motivational influence at all. The first motivational factor is the cash bonus, which is considered as an influential component of the executives' compensation scheme on managers' behaviour. In accordance with Egyptian laws, which determine the compensation scheme for employees, it is deduced that the cash bonus (10% percent of the company's profits) has a great influence on the managers' intention to improve its performance and to report increases in profit number. The second motivational factor is job security. This is seen as a very important motive for corporate management to take into account the results of its operational decisions. Because reporting financial losses resulting from managers' ineffective and poor operational decisions, rather than from abnormal environmental factors e.g. political and/or economic issues, leads to dissatisfaction among the firm owners' with management performance, this in turn threatens managerial jobs. Interestingly, the executives highlighted that the nature of the firm's business affects the extent of managers' concerns about the threat to their jobs. In certain fieldssuch as brokerage -there is a high turnover of employees, which motivates executives to place more emphasis on the firm's financial results in order to maintain their jobs; this greater concern is due to the sensitive relation between reporting losses and the threat to their jobs. The third motivational factor is the managers' professional reputation and career. Building up a good professional reputation in the job market is considered as an important motive for managers to confirm their effectiveness and success in order to become a highly valued human resource; thus, improving the firm's financial image is a way helping them to do so. For managers, their professional reputation is viewed as a form of wealth, which enables them to get a better job in the future when needed. Moreover, professional career is another motive for improving the financial reports. Seeking to improve a firm's financial image for the sake of bettering themselves and enhancing their status and prestige, i.e. gaining a better reputation, job and position, is influenced by which stage a manager is at in his/her career. A person at the beginning of his/her career is motivated and ambitious to improve the firm's financial image to ensure his/her success, and hence to building his/her career. The opposite holds true for executives at the end of their career. However, it is argued that managers who are close to leaving the job market are still motivated to achieve success and to make financial improvements in order to maintain their good professional history. The fourth potential motivational or influential factor is the stockcompensation plan. However, in the Egyptian context, the stockcompensation plan as a way to compensate executives has no effect on managerial motivations to improve the firm's financial position, because such schemes do not exist. This result is in contrast with Bens et al.'s (2002) and Cheng's (2004) findings whose research was conducted in other contexts.
Thus, the effect of the executives' compensation plan as an economic motive depends on the context of the study, because it is determined and defined in accordance with company laws, which differ among countries. The second aim of this paper is to compare external motives and motives of managerial self-interest in accordance with their importance. In the Egyptian context there are two kinds of factors which act as motivations for managers to improve financial results and report favourable results: motives exerted by other firms and bodies which exist in the firm's external context; and managers' self-interested motivations.
The comparison highlights that external motives (i.e. financial suppliers, regulatory bodies, other stakeholders, economic system, managers' beliefs, beating the common earnings target in the field and managers' characteristics and beliefs) go hand in hand with managers' self-interests (i.e. cash bonus, job security and enhancing professional reputation and career); together they form a package of incentives for improving financial results. It has been clearly evidenced that self-interests cannot be gained at the expense of external motives. That is, it is impossible to secure one's own job and to gain professional reputation without establishing a highly-reputed, economically fit and legitimate firm in its context. It is found that a firm's success and interests is the basis of its managers' success and benefits, and that focusing on the executives' self-interests and neglecting the firms' interests is a short-term and temporary aim, which leads to failure for both the firm and its management. It is worth noting that the hierarchy of managerial motives for improving a firm's financial results shows that executives place external environmental factors at the top of the pyramid, as more influential and motivational than selfinterested factors. Those external motivations are followed by executives' self-interests in terms of their importance. Furthermore, this paper compares the two components of managerial self-interests; when factors of managerial self-interest are ordered hierarchically, non-cash motives, i.e. securing the current job and professional reputation, occupy the top of such a hierarchy, followed by monetary motives i.e. cash bonus. It has been clearly evidenced that job market motives are considered more important incentives for improving the FRs than cash bonuses, because job market motives are the basis of getting cash compensations, and not the opposite. This is consistent with Graham et al.'s (2005) research, which cites evidence based on interviewing executives that job security and career image play a more important role in motivating managers to manipulate earnings than compensation incentives.
The empirical findings of this paper contribute to the existing literature concerning EM motivations by casting light on new areas, which have previously been given little -if any-attention, including: 1) Managerial self-interested motives in the Egyptian context for improving the FRs; 2) The influence of the firm's context on determining the companies' regulatory laws, which define the executives' compensation scheme and hence on shaping managers' self-interests; 3) The diversity of managerial incentives; managers are motivated by a package of motives; 4) The relationship between different kinds of managerial motivations and the hierarchical order of such motives in accordance with their importance for executives; 5) The influence of the nature of firm's activity on strengthening the impact of a motive; 6) On the theoretical level, this paper seeks to strengthen the analytical framework of NIS, by overcoming its defaults by taking into account the power and interests of organizational actors as two dynamics for reacting to external pressures or motives.  Is your firm's reputation with its outsiders or your self-interests the most important motivations for improving your company's financial image or reports? Why?  Which incentives are more important: the monetary incentives or the job market incentives? why?
Corporate executives' self-interests motives for improving (FRs
Finally, would you like to add or mention to anything else which we did not cover during our discussion about such phenomenon?
